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Most firms try to avoid conflict when-
ever possible. After all, a company can 
survive only so long as its stakeholders 
will support it. If the government, your 
customers, your investors, or your 
employees don’t provide you with a li-
cence to operate, you probably won’t 
last long. But being neutral in highly 
politicised and very public debates isn’t 
always possible for a firm. When the 
product itself becomes controversial, 
as was the case of hydrocarbon extrac-
tion in an age of public concern about 
global warming, ducking controversy 
isn’t an option.
In a study, Managing impressions 
in the face of rising stakeholder pres-
sures: Examining oil companies’ shifting 
stances in the climate change debate, we 
analysed two extreme but very differ-
ent responses to this communications 
challenge. Exxon fought long and hard 
against the growing consensus around 
global warming. British Petroleum, 
at the same time, tried to cultivate a 
greener and more emotional image. 
Yet as we found after analysing archi-
val materials, media articles, and cor-
porate texts from 1997 to 2009, each 
company found its own way to play a 
difficult hand badly.
Executives, investors, and society all 
paid dearly for these errors, but for us 
as management scholars, the two cases 
offered an interesting opportunity. Most 
cases about impression management 
focus on positive scenarios that recount 
how companies handled their reputa-
tion management well. However, we 
believed that reaching a better under-
standing of how corporate communica-
tions strategies change under extreme 
pressure may be more instructive.
Over time, both companies’ impres-
sion management passed through four 
distinct stages. Each company passed 
through an initial stage, in which it laid 
out its position; then, a stage in which 
it tried to make its view clearer; a third 
stage in which it tried to repair holes in 
its public image; and a final adjustment 
that aligned the company’s official pub-
lic image with its operational reality. 
1. Taking a stance
In 1997, both companies enjoyed strong 
public reputations and were considered 
major players in their industry, but the 
growing global consensus on the seri-
ousness of global warming began to 
change that.  
To fight back, Exxon took out adver-
tisements in The New York Times in 2000 
that asserted the economic risks of sud-
den action on climate change and took 
a sceptical view of global warming as a 
man-made phenomenon. Although the 
company actually did have several en-
vironmentally friendly initiatives going 
on at the time, including projects that 
promoted cogeneration, energy saving, 
and the reduction of three air pollutants 
by 30 per cent, it chose not to empha-
sise that side of its portfolio.
In the late 1990s, after over a century of extracting hydrocarbons, 
the petroleum industry faced a growing scientific consensus that 
pollution from fossil fuels is a major cause of global warming. 
Operationally and in terms of their global image, oil and gas com-
panies faced a serious dilemma. Two major players, Exxon and British 
Petroleum, took very different approaches in their corporate com-
munications strategies, the outcomes of which offer valuable les-
sons in impressions management.  
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ahead of schedule and allocated three 
per cent of its capital investments to 
gas, power and renewables.
However, to an extent the compa-
nies also stuck by their initial positions, 
with Exxon CEO Lee Raymond argu-
ing that renewable investments were 
‘a complete waste of money,’ while BP 
spokespeople insisted that the compa-
ny ‘wanted to play its part in reducing 
harmful emissions.’
3. Repairing reputation
In its third stage, 2005-2006, the com-
panies faced rising pressure from 
shareholders. An Exxon shareholder 
resolution demanding that the com-
pany be more transparent about its 
degree of compliance with the Kyoto 
Accords won more than 25 per cent 
support. At the same time, BP also 
faced more scrutiny and criticism after 
an explosion at a BP refinery in Texas 
killed 15 people and later that year, a 
BP pipeline in Alaska suffered a leak.
In response, Exxon’s new CEO, Rex 
Tillerson, struck a more accommodat-
ing tone and the company raised its 
level of investment in new cleaner, en-
ergy saving technologies. BP, on the 
other hand, apologised, announced 
plans to invest three per cent of its 
capital investments in gas, power, and 
renewables and US$8 billion over the 
next 10 years in alternative energy, in-
cluding natural gas. 
4. Returning to square one
Yet in some respects, the companies 
still did not stray too far from their 
initial stance. Tillerson claimed there 
was still ‘significant uncertainty’ around 
2. Clarifying the position
Between 2001 and 2004, the envi-
ronmentalists’ critique grew sharper. 
For example, Greenpeace and several 
other NGOs started a boycott against 
Esso, Exxon’s European brand, until 
the company changed its policies and 
stopped funding global climate change 
sceptics. BP’s stakeholders also began 
to perceive there was some distance 
between the company’s rhetoric and 
its reality. In particular, Greenpeace 
and others criticised Lord Browne’s 
announcement that BP intended to 
explore for oil in the Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge, Alaska’s last remain-
ing pristine wilderness. Nor did several 
accidents in its Alaska operations help 
its reputation for clean energy. 
Both companies tried to reframe 
the debate in this stage. Exxon spokes-
people began to acknowledge the “po-
tential” for human–induced climate 
change and defended its donations 
to climate change sceptics as a way 
to “broaden the debate.” The compa-
ny also announced a plan to donate 
US$100 million to the Stanford climate 
change project, and made ongoing in-
vestments in energy efficiency, emis-
sion reduction, and innovation.  
At the same time, BP back-pedaled. 
Spokespeople explained that their 
“Beyond Petroleum” slogan should 
not be taken as a ‘literal statement’ 
and that they were not leaving the pe-
troleum industry. Browne said it meant 
instead that the company was ‘going 
beyond the conventional way of deal-
ing with petroleum.’ Substantively, the 
company reached its greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction target eight years 
British Petroleum, on the other 
hand, was the first oil company to state 
that the global warming problem was 
one of its major responsibilities. The 
CEO, Lord Browne, told students at 
Stanford University in 1997 that the 
company was tackling climate change 
because ‘it is the right thing to do.’ It 
also quit the industry-friendly Global 
Climate Coalition and set a sales goal 
to build its solar energy business to 
US$1 billion within 10 years.
Most of all ,  in 2000, British 
Petroleum began a US$200 million 
campaign to position itself as an en-
vironmentally forward-thinking com-
pany. In the course of the campaign 
the company shortened its name to 
BP, unveiled a bright green, white and 
yellow sunburst logo, and launched 
an advertising campaign, Beyond 
Petroleum, to focus the public on its 
non-fossil fuel projects. However, the 
substantive side was much less ac-
tive: approximately two per cent of 
the company’s capital investments 
were made in natural gas, electrical 
power, and renewables.  
In the beginning, stakeholder pres-
sures were low at both companies. In 
1998, Exxon received its first share-
holder resolution demanding the 
company make an effort to prevent 
global warming, but the proposal won 
only four per cent of the sharehold-
ers’ votes. BP did earn criticism, from 
Greenpeace, the radical environmental 
NGO, which described the company’s 
stance as a ‘triumph of style over sub-
stance’ and claimed that in 1999 the 
company had spent more on rebrand-
ing its logo than on alternative energy. 
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A corporate reputation is often an 
uneasy combination of symbol and 
substance, but in the end, stakehold-
er pressure tends to force more con-
gruence between them. Symbolic and 
substantive actions tend to harmonise. 
With so much societal scrutiny, it be-
comes increasingly difficult to say one 
thing but do another. 
How might companies facing this 
kind of difficult problem handle it bet-
ter? Three ideas come to mind:
• Don’t get too emotionally invested 
in a particular interpretation of the 
controversy. While some desire to 
“save face” is understandable, hav-
ing the courage to admit that you 
were wrong is sometimes desirable.
• Face difficult conversations early, 
particularly with advocacy groups. 
If they feel ignored or left out of the 
discussion, they might be more like-
ly to engage in hostile actions.
• Don’t cultivate a reputation too far 
removed from the realities of your 
business. People forgive mistakes 
more readily than hypocrisy.  
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global warming, while BP continued to 
describe renewables as a ‘real and vi-
able business’ and claimed it was in-
vesting heavily in alternative energy.
Finally, in 2007, in the face of rising 
pressure, each company modified its 
stance. Exxon acknowledged that ‘the 
risk is serious and action should be 
taken’ with respect to climate change, 
and invested US$600 million to de-
velop algae biofuels. BP, in the mean-
time, under pressure from sharehold-
ers to earn more on hydrocarbons 
and lose less on renewables, argued 
that focusing on oil and gas and disin-
vesting in some of its renewable pro-
jects ‘was a perfectly reasonable way 
of proceeding.’ 
These cases suggest that even 
when companies sustain this level of 
public pressure, their strategy tends 
to change only gradually. Companies 
often suffer from a great deal of path 
dependency: once a company has been 
defending a particular view of itself, ex-
ecutives feel compelled to stick to this 
view, or (if that is no longer tenable) 
to try to explain away the inconsisten-
cy between current and past actions 
and positions. 
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“A corporate reputation is often an uneasy 
combination of symbol and substance, but in 
the end, stakeholder pressure tends to force 
more congruence between them.”
